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work of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of 
values. We show that under reasonable parameters the economy has two steady 
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1 Introduction 
Mohammedans are Mohammedans because they are bom and reared among the 
sect, not because they have thought it out and can furnish sound reasons for be-
ing Mohammedans; we know why Catholics are Catholics; why Presbyterians are 
Presbyterians; why Baptists are Baptists; why Mormons are Mormons; why thieves 
are thieves; why monarchists are monarchist; why Republicans are Republicans and 
Democrats, Democrats. We know that it is a matter of association and sympathy, 
not reasoning and examination; that hardly a man in the world has an opinion on 
morals, politics, or religion that he got otherwise than through his associations and 
sympathies Mark Twain. 
Recent scandals in Japan, Italy and Spain show that corruption is not an exclusive phe-
nomenon of underdeveloped countries. Countries with similar degrees of development 
exhibit enormous differences in the levels of corruption. Models linking corruption solely 
with the degree of economic development cannot explain these faets. Nor are they fully 
captured by institutional differences. Incentive and punishment schemes for corrupt activ-
ities certainly infiuence the level of corruption, but a given scheme does not work equally 
well in all countries. This suggests that corruption may be due, at least in part, to cultural 
elements. 
This paper focuses on the cultural transmission of corruption and develops policy 
measures which can reduce corruption within this framework. Different attitudes towards 
corruption are incorporated into preferences as a moral cost due to the feeling of guilt. 
For simplicity, we assume that there are just two types of agents: honest "moral" agents 
and potentially dishonest agents who only care about monetary payoffs. Thecrucial point 
of this paper is that while these values are transmitted from one generation to the next, 
the incentives of parents to shape their offsprings' attitudes towards corruption depend 
on economic factors. 
The idea that morality enters into agents' preference ordering via feelings stretches 
back to Arrow (1967) and has been often used in the context of corruption (e.g. Rose-
Ackerman (1978), Chinn (1978), Block and Heinecke (1975), Andvig and Moene (1990), 
Besley and Mclaren (1993), Qizilbash (1994)).1 Typical1y, two modeling techniques are 
used: (i) the conformist approach incorporates moral feelings directIy into the utility 
function. (ii) The lexicographic approach incorporates moral considerations by the use 
of lexicographical preferences. In this case morality enters discontinuously since it only 
matters in cases of indifference on other grounds. The present paper fol1ows the tradition 
of the conformist approach. It goes beyond existing models by explicitIy recognizing the 
implicit assumption that morality is a result of socialization2 • 
The intergenerational transmission of knowledge, values, and other factors that in-
fiuence behaviour plays an important role in the evolution of societies. Cultural traits, 
such as the attitudes towards immigrants or the environment, ethics in the work place, 
or looking left and right beforecrossing a street become part of the phenotype of an indi-
vidual and are very likely to be transmitted by learning and imitation. In this paper we 
lThis idea is supported by a number of psychological, sociological and experimental studies (see e.g. 
Coursey et al. (1987) and Frank (1988)). 
2Akerlof (1983) already recognized that education infiuences honesty. 
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focus in the intergenerational transmission of attitudes against corruption, incorporating 
both vertical transmission, with offsprings learning from their parents, and oblique trans-
mission, with offsprings learning from sorne member of the parent's generation (see Boyd 
and Richerson (1985)). Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1982) provide evidence for vertical 
transmission of cultural traits such as religious beliefs, political attitudes, the frequency 
of praying and attending the church, sportive practices, the frequency of listening to c1as-
sical music, salt usage...etc. LeBras and Todd (1981) hypothesize that family structure 
strongly infiuences political beliefs. Phenomena like the Mafia seem to have their origin 
in societies where families are strong institutions and children are exposed, from the very 
beginning, to a homogenous set of cultural models in the family (Cavalli-Sforza (1996)). 
An example of the infiuence of oblique transmission on corruption levels is Hong Kong 
where public attitudes against corruption changed drastical1y in the last decades due to 
the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and especial1y its community 
relations department. The main emphasis of the ICAC education program was to "build 
a strong altruism and a sense of responsibility in oneself and toward the others", de-
emphasizing the importance of getting money and getting ahead at the expenses of the 
others (Clark (1987)). Sorne empirical studies point out that the perception of corruption 
as a social problem in Hong Kong depends to sorne extent on age (and therefore on the 
time the different groups were exposed to the ICAC). For instance, in 1986, 75.1% of the 
15-24 age group ( which had been subject to the ICAC's education program for about 13 
years) believed that corruption was a social problem whereas only 54% of the 45-64 age 
group (who were born and lived their formative years when the ICAC didn't exist)agreed 
with that. 
Vertical and oblique transmission are incorporated into our theory by assuming that 
ethics against corruption are transmitted via education. The transmission model is similar· 
to Bisin and Verdier (1996). A simple overlapping generation model with principal-
agent relation, rational expectations and random matching is postulated. In each period, 
infinitely lived principals are randomly matched to the agents. At any time period an 
agent may give birth to a child who will become active in the next periodo During the 
rearing period the parent has to educate his child.3 (Stochastic death keeps the population 
constant). Parents care about their children and want to maximize their child's wel1-being. 
However, given that they do not know what is best for their child, they evaluate their 
child's welfare as if it were their own4 . Fol1owing Bisin and Verdier (1996) the cultural 
parent chooses the "coefficient of cultural transmission", or the education effort i.e, the 
probability with which the parent's cultural trait is adopted by the child. When the child 
does not "learn" from the parent, he imitates a randomly chosen member of the parent's 
generation. In this world, if education were free, parents would choose to transmit their 
preferences with probability 1 and the society wouldn't evolve. If education in the family 
3 Although asexual reproduction is not a good representation oC the biological world in which repro-
duction is mostly sexual, it mightbe a good approximation to the evolution oC cultural traits. When the 
transmission takes place between parents and offspring (vertical transmission), although both parents 
contribute to the cultural traits inherited by the offspring, it may happen that sorne traits are trans-
mited in a uniparental way (religion seems to be transmitted exclusively by the mother). The relation 
teacher-pupil is another example of a single cultural parent. 
4Alternatively, the model could be interpreted as parents caring about their child's behaviour or 
parents caring about the survival of their own preCerences. 
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were prohibitively expensive, new agents would fol1ow a "conformist" learning mechanism, 
and the spread of the most frequent trait would be observed. The higher the education 
effort, the smal1er the importance of this frequency-dependent bias (Boyd and Richerson 
(1985)). 
In our model, as in a typical principal-agent model, corruption exists because of asym-
metric information and costly monitoring. In our information structure each principal 
knows the exact proportion of dishonest players in the population and has sorne (imper-
fect) information about the honesty of the agent he is facing. There is no information 
leakage across principals. 
Our basic principal-agent model is related to Tirole (1996). In each period a principal 
has to assign a project to the agent he is randomly matched with. There are two types 
of projects. Project 1 is social1y better than project 2 if managed with honesty. The 
reverse is true if the agent behaves dishonest1y. The projects can be interpreted as two 
different public investments, one more cost1y than the other and with a higher social 
return if managed correct1y. This.project, by involving a larger amount of money, is 
more susceptible to corruption (selection of worse materials, manipulation of al1ocation 
mechanism such as auctions... ). Think for instance of project 1 as the construction of new 
roads and project 2 as resources devoted to the maintenance of existing ones. 
We show that under reasonable parameters both types of agents choose positive trans-
mission coefficients. This implies that any stable steady state is interior and that cor-
ruption is never eliminated completely as long as sorne corrupt behaviour existed in the 
pasto We show that under rational expectations there are two pure strategy steady states. 
In the low corruption steady state, the principals ofié project 1 to al1 agents for whom 
there is no evidence of corrupt behaviour and project 2 to al1 those agents for whom such 
evidence exists. In the high corruption steady state only project 2 is offered. In this case 
the existence of dishonest players exerts a negative externality on the honest players. The 
general suspicion prevents honest people from getting good projects. 
The steady states are related to Tirole's (1996) whose model has three types of agents 
in fixed proportions, honest, dishonest and opportunistic agents. Which steady state arises 
depends on whether or not opportunists choose to be honesto While both models serve 
to illustrate how col1ective reputation can outweigh individual reputation (or vice versa) 
thereby affecting the overal1 corruption level of society, Tirole's model cannot provide 
a convincing explanation why countries with the same level of development and similar 
institutions nevertheless may have drastical1y different levels of corruption. In his model 
cultural attitudes exist in fixed proportions and cannot change oVer time. The present pa-
per does provide an answer to the aboye question. Cultural attitudes evolve endogenously 
and which steady state is reached is history-dependent. Three parameter regimes are dis-
tinguished: (i) the high corruption steady state is reached always, (ii) the low torruption 
steady state is reached always and (iii) one of the steady states is reached depending on 
initial conditions. (i) and (ii) result from extremely poor or nearly perfect monitoring 
technologies of principals. Therefore, it seems a reasonable guess toassume that most 
countries are likely to be in (iii). 
For the lalter case the paper develops sorne temporary policy measures in order to 
permanent1y manipulate the cultural transmission coefficients. The advantages and dis-
advantages of each measure are discussed. Two time consistent policy measures with 
4 
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long lasting effects on the level of corruption are proposed. The first policy consists of a 
temporary increase in the monitoring expenditure and, consequent1y, in the accuracy of 
the information gathered by the principals. Such a policy can drive the economy out of 
the high corruption steady state into the basin of attraetion of the low corruption equi-
librium. In the second policy the principals announce at t that they will give project 1 
from periodt + k onwards to everybody with a clean record. ,This announcement (com-
mitment) increases the future value of being honest aboye the one of being dishonest and 
the proportion of honest agents starts increasing in t + 1. We show that there exists a k 
(which depends on the parameters of the model) such that such a policy is optimal. The 
policy announcement triggers a change in the education efforts exerted by the different 
types of parents which makes the policy announcement time consistent. We also discuss 
the effect of (temporary) public education campaigns and show that they successful1y 
reduce the level of corruptions if and only if they are intensive enough, Le. if the public 
education effort is high enough. This condition seems to have been satisfied in the case 
of Hong Kong. 
The paper is organized as fol1ows. In section 2 we introduce the model and charaeterize 
the steady states. Policy implications are spelt out in section 3 and the effects of public 
education campaigns are discussed. Section 4 concludes. 
The marlel 
We propose a principal-agent model similar to Tirole's (1996). We consider a random 
matching model where each agent can never meet the same principal twice. At each time 
t (-00 < t < (0) every active agent is matched with a new principal. The principal gives 
the agent one of 2 projects. Project 1 yields a higher payoff to the principal than project . 
2 if the agent is honest, but is more susceptible to corrupt behaviour. The payoffs to the 
principal are 
H>h?-d>D 
where capital letters denote the payoffs to theprindpal if project 1 is given. H stands 
for honest and D for dishonest behaviour by the agent. 
Agents can be of two types: honest or potential1y dishonest. The payoffs to an honest 
agent are as fol1ows 
honest type 
Project 1 Project 2 
honest B b 
dishonest B -e b-e 
With B,B,b,b,e > Oand 
e > B - B ?- b- b ?- O. (1) 
If (1) holds, honest agents always behave honest1y. Observe that an honest agent suffers 
from being dishonest. He is endowed with a moral attítude which favours "honest" be-
haviour. On the contrary, potential1y dishonest agents only care about monetary payoffs, 
5 
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potentia11y dishonest type 
Project 1 Project 2 
honest B b 
dishonest f3 b 
Under (1) dishonest behaviour is a dominating strategy in the one shot game. There-
after, since we assume that (1) holds, we sha11 refer to potentia11y dishonest players as 
dishonest. 
The model is a model of overlapping generations. A Poisson birth and death process is 
assumed. An active agent in t has a child with probability (1- A). The child is educated 
by the parent and becomes active in t + 1. With probability A an active agent will be 
active next periodo Observe that the population size of active players is constant. We can 
think for example of a situation in which there is some turnover in the job and newcomers 
are trained by people with experience. The crucial assumption is that an agent does care 
about his offsprings' welfare and wl,1en deciding how much effort to put into his child's 
education evaluates his child's utility through his own eyes. In other words he uses his 
payoff matrix as if it were his child's, like in Bisin and Verdier (1996). 
The education process works as fo11ows: The parent educates his naive child with 
some education effort T. With probability equal to the education effort, education will be 
successful and the child will be like his parent. Otherwise, the child remains naive and 
gets random1y matched with somebody else whose preferences he will adopto Consider an 
honest agent who has a child at time t and chooses education effort T a and let Ptij be the 
probability that a child of parent i is of type j 
Pta - Tt + (1 - Tta)qt (2) 
Ptb - (1 - T~)(l - qt) (3) 
where qt is the proportion of honest agents at time t. Similar1y, for the dishonest parent 
we get 
pr T; + (1 - T;)(1 - qd (4) 
p;a _ (1 - T;)qt (5) 
where T b is the dishonest parents' education effort. 
2.1 The education choice 
Let e(T) be the cost of the education effort T and assume that e(O) = O, e' > O and 
e" > O. 
A parent of type i chooses the education effort T E [0,1] that maximizes 
(6) 
where pij and pii are defined aboye and V ij is the utility a parent with preferences i 
ijattributes to his child having preferences j. In order to assess V a parent of type i uses 
his own payoff matrix. Therefore Vii> Vij always. Notice that vij is an expected utility 
6 
and depends on the poliey expeetations of the parent. Maximizing (6) with respeet to T 
we get the fo1l6wing first order eondition 
' ( i) = dpii yii dpij yijC T d'T t + dT t. (7) 
where we have suppressed the time indieators. 
Substituting (2)-(5) in (7) we get the optimal edueation efforts T a and T b , 
C' (Ta) = [yaa - yab](l - q) (8) 
C' (Tb) = [ybb _ yba]q (9) 
In order to have interior solutions T E (0,1) we need that C'(O) = O and that C'(l) > 
B/(l - )..), whieh is the upper bound to agents' payoffs. From (8) and (9) it follows that 
the optimal effort level is T = T(q) with 
yaa _ yab 
--;----;-:--:- < O andC"(T a ( q)) 
dTb(q) ybb _ yba 
dq = C"(Tb(q)) > O. 
Sinee yii - yij depends on the parent's poliey expeetations, so does the optimal effort 
level T. 
We ean now eharaeterize the dynamie behaviour of qt: 
substituting (2) and (5) and suppressing the time subseripts, we obtain 
F(q) = )..q + (1 - )..)[(Ta(q) + (1 - Ta(q))q)q + (1 - Tb(q))q(l - q)] 
whieh ean be rewritten as 
(10) 
Observe that (10) has three rest points: i) q = O, ii) q = 1 and iii) q = q*, 
yaa _ yab 
q* - -------- (11)Ybb _ Yba + Yaa _ yab 
Lemma 1 Assume that C"(T) ~ C'(T) > O 101' all T =1= O, C'(O) = O and C'(l) > 
maXi yii - yij , yaa - yab > O and ybb - yba > O. The only stable rest point is q*. 
Proof. See appendix. 
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2.2 The principals' choice 
Each period a principal has to decide what project to delegate on the agent he is matched 
with. We assume that principals maximize their expected payoffs and that they know 
the proportion of honest agents in the population but not the type of a particular agent. 
As in Tirole (1996) we assume that the principal has sorne imperfect information about 
each agent's past behaviour: with probability a he knows if the agent has been dishonest 
at least once in the pasto Hence, the principal either observes a clean or a dirty record. 
An honest agent will never be revealed as dishonest. Moreover, there is no information 
leakage across principals5 • If one principal observes an agent with a dirty record it can 
still be the case that in the future the same agent is taken for an honest one. Given this 
information structure, if it pays to be dishonest once it pays to be always dishonest. As 
dirty records cannot be cleaned, the probability of being discovered as a dishonest agent 
is the same independentiy of the times one agent has been dishonest. 
Let a 8 be the sepamting stmtegy consisting of offering projeet 1 to agents with a 
seemingly clean record and project 2' to agents with a dirty record. Assume that principals 
fol1ow strategy a 8 , then potential1y dishonest player will behave dishonestiy if 
(12) 
Assume now that (12) holds, then the proportion of corrupt agents with a clean track 
record is (1 - q)Y where Y is the average probability that past corruption activities go 
unnoticed, 
y = (1 - A)[l + A(l - a) + A2 (1 - a) + ... + Ak(l - a) + ...] = 1 -Aa (13) 
Let aP be the pooling stmtegy of offering project 2 to everybody. 
policy a 8 to aP if 
q(H - h) + (1 - q)Y(D - d) > O 
Principals prefer 
(14) 
which can be rewritten as 
_ (1 - Aa)(d - D) (15)q > q = (H - h) + (d - D) (1 - Aa)' 
Let a(qt) denote the principals' optimal policy at time t, namely 
if qt > q 
íf qt = q 
if qt < q 
2.3 The steady states. 
We now characterize the steady states of the economy. The education effort exerted by 
a parent in t depends on the expectation about the principals' policy in the future. A 
"policy" is an (infinite) sequence {aZ}~tl' with az E {a8,aP }, for al1 Z. We will denote 
5Information leakage across principals does not affect the qualitative results of the papero 
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by {ai}~~ , the sequence consisting of the repetition of ai from tI to t2 (tI < t2 ::; (0). Let 
T(k¡) be theeducation effort of a parent in t who expects a policy k¡ = {az }~t+l and let 
Vii(k¡) be the expected utility a parent of type i attributes to his child born in t (and 
active in t + 1) having preferences j when the expected policy is k¡' 
Lemma 2 Assume G'(T) > a and that condition (12) holds. Then 
1. Ta({aS}~I) > Tb({aS}~I)' when qt < ij 
2. Ta({aP}~I) > Tb({aP}r-I-l)' when qt < 9. 
3. Ta({{aS}T;l, {aP}T'}) > Tb({{aS}T+i1 , {aP}T'}), when qt < ij- AT- t- 1(ij_ 9.), 
4. Ta({{aP}T+-l1 , {aS}T'}) > Tb({{aP}T+-l, {aS}T'}), 
when qt < q + AT- t- 1(ij -
_
q) + ,-\T-t-la(l_ A) B-b , where
_ e 
e - (b - b) _ e + Aa(B - b) - (B - B) 
q = and q = . 
- e e 
Proof. From (8)-(9) we get that Ta(k¡) > Tb(k¡) when 
vaa(k¡) - Vab(k¡) 
(16)qt < Vbb(k[) _ Vba(k[) + vaa(k[) - vab(k[) 
Computing the right hand side of (16) for the different expected policy profiles we get the 
values above. O 
The previous lemma compares the education efforts exerted by the two types of parent 
for four different expectations, two of them stationary (cases 1 and 2) and two of them 
involving a policy change at a Euture date T (cases 3 and 4). Observe that ij > 9.. when 
(13 - b) - (B - b)
aA> -- (17)B -b 
The average probability that past corruption is not detected has to be small relative 
to the relative increase in payoffs for honest and dishonest agents under regimes aS and 
aP• 
Proposition 1 Assume G"(T) ~ G'(T) > a for all T,qo 0:1 {a, 1}, (12), (11) hold, princi-
pals follow a(qt) and agents have rational expectations. Then, 
1. qt converges to ij if ij < 9.' 
2. qt converges to 9.. if ij > ij and 
3. when 9. < ij < ij 
(a) qt converges io ij if qo > ij and 
(b) qt converges 9. if qo < ij . 
9 
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Proof. See appendix . 
We refer tó q and q as the low corruption and the high corruption steady states, 
respectively6. -
Observe that the steady state the system converges to depends for cases 1 and 2 on 
the location of qwith respect to qand q and in case 3, on the initial proportion of honest 
players. A too inefficient monitoring t;chnique (high q) implies that the low corruption 
steady state q can never be reached. A very efficient technique avoids the high corruption 
steady state. The smaller q the larger the basin of attraction of q. This implies that in a 
economy with infrequent renewal (large >') it is easier to reach the low corruption steady 
state since q decreases with >.. The underlying intuition is that if agents live longer the 
average probability that past corrupt activities go unnoticed falls. The principals have a 
more accurate pieture of individual behaviour. 
Policy measures. 
Under rational expectations the steady state the system converges to is determined by 
the relative positions of q, 9.. and ij and in the case in which 9.. < q< q also by the initial 
proportion of honest agents. While the position of q only depends on the payoff matrices 
of the agents, q and q also depend on the frequ;ncy of renewals >. and the accuracy 
of the principal's information a. Hence, feasible policy measures will have to affect the 
remuneration to agents or the accuracy of principals' information or agents' expectations7 . 
We shall now discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these measures. 
Changing the remuneration to the agents will affect equilibrium values direetly. An 
increase in the payoff when agents behave honestly in projeet 1 (B) and in project 2 
(b) increases the equilibrium proportion oí honest players in the low and in the high 
corruption equilibria, respectively. The same is true for a decrease of B and b. However, 
principals will face sorne restrictions when choosing remunerations.. A payoff increase 
can only be achieved by higher wages and has to be financed somehow. Moreover, higher 
wages simultaneously increase B (or b) and B (or b). In order to lower B or b principals 
would have to be able to restriet the extent of corrupt activities somehow. This might 
not always be possible. 
A similar problem arises concerning an increase in the accuracy of principals' informa-
tion a. The choice of a is infiuenced by technological restrictions. Therefore, unless sorne 
new monitoring technology is discovered, it is not reasonable to assume that principals 
can improve their information forever. Given the technological constraints principals can 
improve their a only by incurring higher costs which cannot be optimal in the long run 
because otherwise principals would have operated at these higher costs to begin with. 
Nevertheless, if q< q, there is room for a temporary increase in spendingon monitoring. 
Notice, that an increase in the accuracy of information and thereby in the probability 
of detecting fraudulent behaviour will shift ij to a lower value, will increase the basin 
6Information leakage across principals would not affect the position of the high corruption steady state. 
However, given that principals have better information, the basin of attraetion of the low corruption 
steady state would increase as well as the proportion of honest agents in this equilibrium. 
7We assume that the frequency of renewals cannot be affected by principals. 
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of attraction of the low corruption steady state and at the same time the proportion of 
honest behaviour in such an equilibrium. Assume that q < ij and that there exists an 
a E]a, 1] such that q(a) = !1., then the high corruption steady state can be left by a 
temporary increase in a. Given a, the separating strategy aS is optimal and people with 
a clean record will get project 1. By lemma 2 the high corruption steady state will be left 
if honest agents expect k~ = {aS}~l' The principal can ensure this by reducing spending 
on monitoring to the original (optimal) level in such a way that q(a) is always smaller 
than qt in all periods t. 
In the aboye policy measure principals behave optimally given the accuracy of their 
information ato Therefore, if agents can observe how much principals spent on monitoring 
the policy measure is perfect1y credible. Moreover, this policy is feasible if the temporary 
increase in spending is off-set by the gains from reaching the low corruption steady state. 
Bya similar argument, principals could incur a cost by simply giving the good project 
in abad environment (qt < q) to stimulate education efforts of honest parents. In other 
words principals would have to apply the separating policy aSdespite its being suboptimal 
over several periods. The latter policy is unlikely to be implemented since principals 
cannot commit to ignoring their cut-off value q. For this policy to be effective agents 
would have to believe that principals are willing to behave in a sub-optimal manner. The 
temporary increase in spending on monitoring differs from simply ignoring the cut-off 
value since, under the former, the resulting behaviour of principals is optimal given the 
observed increase in monitoring costs. 
AH policy measures discussed so far worked by changing some variable which affected 
agents' expectations and therefore their education efforts. We now consider an alternative 
policy which affects agents' expectations directly and in which principals always behave 
optimally by announcing a time consistent policy change in the future. 
Assume that the economy is in the high corruption steady state; everybody is getting 
project 2 independently of their records. In the high corruption steady state no principal 
has an incentive to give project 1 to anybody, not even if a clean record is observed. 
Assume now, that at t principals commit to the policy profile {{aP}f;/, {aSp?}, namely, 
they will offer project 2 to everybody (pooling strategy) until time T - 1, and from 
T onwards projeet 1 will be offered only to those players with clean records (separating 
strategy). Observe that this is different from an amnesty because sinners are not forgiven8 • 
Lemma 3 Assume that qt = !1., O(r) = r/3, with (3 ~ 2 , a ::; ~-=-~ and that parents 
choose optimally their education efforts given k~ = {{aP}f+l1 , {aS}T'}. Then, 
r a ( { {aP}f;l, {aS}T'}) > r b({{aP}f;/, {aS}T'}) for all t E [s, T]. 
Proof. See appendix. 
Proposition 2 Assume that conditions of lemma 3 hold, then policy {{aP}f+-/, {aS}T'} 
is credible if qT-l ::;q ::; qT 
8Tirole (1996) considers the possibility of an amnesty. He shows that an amnesty is always detrimental 
in steady state although it yields a Pareto improvement if society is out of steady state. Notíce that in 
his model our policy measure cannot work, while in our model an amnesty is uninteresting since adults 
cannot change their preferences. 
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Figure 1: Time consistent policy announcement 
Proof. It fol1ows direct1y from the previous lemma and from the fact that when qt 2: q, 
a(qt) = aS. By lemma 2 Ta({aS}t¡.l}) > Tb({aS}t¡.d) ,and qt > qforal1 t > T. 
Figure 1 is an illustration of proposition 2. The economy is initial1y in the high 
corruption equilibrium. The continuous line is the valueof ij. The announcement of the 
policy change in T = 15 increases the honest parents' effort today and q starts growing. 
At T = 14 the economy has reached the critical value .q and' from T = 15 on it is 
optimal to start offering project 1 to agents with clean records. This way the society can 
leave the high corruption equilibrium"after the time consistent announcement. The policy 
announcement is time consistent because at the moment of the change the proportion of 
honest players in the population is such that (15) is satisfied and aSis the optimal policy 
sequence from then onwards. Observe that by proposition 1, the system converges to the 
low corruption steady state. The result is driven by the fact that the policy announcement 
raises the value of being honest more than it increases the value of being dishonest. Honest 
parents, foreseeing that in the future it will pay to be honest increase their education effort 
once such a policy is announced. 
The aboye policy measures al1 aim at affecting the driving force of the population 
dynamics: the education effort exerted by parents. Moral education is a purely private 
issue. We shall now analyze the effectiveness of education campaigns in which the existing 
public education systems are used to emphasize moral values. 
In most countries public education does not start immediately when a child is born. 
Usual1y, children are exposed to the infiuence of their parents before undergoing public 
education. To respect this common education structure we assume that only children who 
remain naive, Le. who do not learn their preferences from their parents, can be infiuenced 
by public education. An education campaign will be modeled as society (or principals) 
investing in public moral education by choosing a public effort level p to teach honest 
behaviour at school. Similar to private education efforts, the public education effort 
represents the probability with which a child who did not learn from his parents adopts 
honest preferences in school. The new timing of moral education is as follows: as before, 
the education effort of the parents T determines the probability with which children adopt 
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the same preferences as their parents. With the complementary probability (l-r) children 
remain naive in which case the public education effort p determines the probability with 
which children become honesto With the complementary probability public education 
fails and children meet a random member of society whose preferences they adopto 
Public education affects the probabilities of honest and dishonest children as follows!l: 
paa
t - rt + (1 - rt)(qt(l - p) + p) (18) 
p'ab
t - (1 -rt)(l - qt)(l - p) (19) 
p,bb
t - r; + (1 - r;)(l - qt)(l - p) (20) 
pba 
t - (1 - rt)(qt(1- p) +p) (21) 
The first order conditions which determine the private education efforts are now, 
C'(ra) =, [vaa - V abJ(l - q)(l - p) (22) 
C'(rb) = [V bb - V baJ(q(l - p) +p) (23) 
The new population dynamics are given by the following difference equation for qt: 
6.q = (1 - A)q(l - q)(ra(q) - rb(q))(l - p) + (1 - A)(l - q)(l - rb(q))p (24) 
which can be rewritten as 
(25) 
This difference equation shows that (i) q = 1 is always a rest point of the system, 
(ii) q = O is only a rest if no public education exists (p = O), (iii) if an interior solution 
exists, the education effort of dishonest parents is higher than of honest parents (r a < r b). 
The introduetion of public education has two opposite effeets: while its direct effect is 
to increase the proportion of honest agents, its indirect effect is to change the incentives 
for private education; honest parents educate less because public education increases the 
chances of their children getting the right preferences anyway while dishonest parents 
educate more. Which effect will dominate partly depends on the value of p. Notice, 
that if p=l the system converges to q = 1 although honest parents do not educate their 
children at all. Hence, for p = 1, 6.q > O for all q < 1. By- continuity, there exists a ji 
such that for p > ji 6.q > Ofor all q < 1. Indeed, it is easy to see that for p > r b(l) q = 1 
is the only attraetor lO • 
The aboye analysis establishes the success of a temporary intensive education campaign 
with a high enough p. Suppose society is in the high corruption steady state and ij < ij. 
The government launches a very intensive education campaign with p > r b(l). The 
campaign affects the population dynamics and the proportion of honest agents increases. 
9 P = O is identical to the case without public education 
lOThis is not the cut-off value. A complete analysis of the model becomes very messy and is beyond 
the scope of the papero We are only interested in finding sorne temporary education campaign which is 
successful. 
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The education campaign can be stopped once qt > (ji by lemma 2 the system converges 
to the low corruption steady state ij. 
To summarize, temporary education campaigns will be successful in reducing corrup-
tion if they are intensive enough. lE pis too low, qt will remain below (j and it will not be 
optimal for principals to switch to the separating policy. Education campaigns work only 
if the investment in public education is high enough during the period of the campaign 
and the campaign lasts long enough. 
Both conditions seemed to have been satisfied in the case of Hong Kong. The education 
effort of the Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) had been very high and 
the project lasted a substantial period of time. Moreover, at least in early years, ICAC 
combined two policy measures discussed in our model: re-education and a change in 
the remunerations to agents to reduce the profitability of corruption. This combination 
accelerates the move towards the low corruption steady state. 
Conclusion 
There is evidence that corruption is at least part1y due to cultural elements. Not in every 
country does the public opinion conceive corruption - at least small-scale corruption - as 
negative. Sentences like "1 was corrupt but so was everybody else" reveal that a generally 
corrupt environment can serve as a justification for one's own corrupt behaviour. 
The present paper captures some cultural aspects of corruption. An agent is corrupt 
if corruption maximizes utility. However, utility is not only affected by purely monetary 
rewards but also by the presence (or absence) of moral costs if engaging in corrupt activ-
ities. In the model remunerations were chosen such that an agent is either always honest 
or always corrupto Analyzing this extreme case allows to single out the purely educational 
effects on corruption levels. In order to do so it was assumed that new-born agents had to 
form their preferences and were infiuenced by the education effort exerted by their parent 
as wen as by the general corruption level of society. Parents care about their children and 
judge their children's utility as if it were their own. The resulting dynamics hadthe real-
istic feature that the lower the proportion of a given type the higher its education effort. 
This feature keeps the steady state off the boundary and avoids a complete elimination 
of corrupt (or honest) agents. 
Taking the model seriously implies that corruption will never be eliminated completely, 
a view which is also expressed by Klitgaard (1988). Indeed, there is no country without 
corruption although corruption levels vary widely across countries even with similar eco-
nomic characteristics. The present model found two steady states one with a low and 
one with a high level of corruption in an otherwise identical economy. This shows the 
strength of cultural elements in determining the actual corruption levels of a society and 
implies that two countries with the same level of development and the same institutions 
against corruption may have drastically different levels of corruption depending on the 
initial state of the society. In the high corruption steady state the public reputation out-
weighs individual reputation and thereby locks society into highly corrupt behaviour. In 
the low corruption steady state individual reputation is decisive. 
Controlling corruption imposes a cost on society. Individual behaviour has to be 
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monitored. If monitoring is common and the technique is reliable, it pays less to be 
corrupto This is also true for high fines. Both the present model and models concentrating 
purely on monetary rewards share this desirable feature. The advantage of the present 
approach is that it entails additional policy implications which can be cost-saving in the 
long runo High fines and high monitoring work only as long as they are implemented. If, 
however, young generations are educated to adapt a moral attitude against corruption, 
monitoring can be reduced while low corruption levels are preserved. Educating the young 
is the key element in reducing corruption successfully. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1 
substituting (8) and (9) in (26) 
F'(q) = 1 + (1- >')(1 _ 2q)(ra(q) _ rb(q)) _ (1 _ >.)[qG'(ra(q)) + (1 - q)G'(rb(q))] 
G"(r a (q)) G"(r b( q)) 
Evaluating F'(q) in q* we get 
, * G'(r*)
F (q ) = 1 - (1 - >.) G"(r*) E (0,1) 
where r* = ra(q*) = rb(q*). By the mean value theorem 
F(q) - q* = F(q) - F(q*) = (q - q*)F'(c) 
for sorne c E [min{q,q*} ,max{q,q*}]. For c sufficient1y close to q*, 0< F'(c) < 1 and 
IF(q) - q*1 < Iq - q*1 
qt+l = F(qt) is closer to q* than qt. 
Similar1y, F'(O) > 1 andF'(l) > 1 and, by the mean valuetheorem, IF(q)-OI > \q-Ol 
and IF(q) -11> Iq-11. We conclude that q* is stable and q = Oand q = 1 are unstable.D 
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Proof of Proposition 1. ij < q < ij by (12). Assume without 10ss oí generality that 
qo < ij. 
Part 1.1. Consider the expected policy profiJe {{aP}f;/, {aS}T'}. Observe that 
ij < q < q + )...T-t-l(ij _ q) + )...T-t-la (l - )...)(B - b). 
By 1emma (2) Tta({{aP}f+l1, {aS}~T}) > Tf( {{aP}f+l1, {aS}~T})' for aH t such that qt < ij, 
and F(qt) > qt, by (10), for aH such qt. There exists a w > Osuch that qw :S ij :S F(qw)' 
Let w be equa1 to T - 1. . 
Part 1.2.The expected p01icy at T-1 = w is {aS}~T and Tta({aS}~T) > Tf({aS}~T) for 
aH qt < ij by 1emma (1). Furthermore, 
v:aa({ S}OO ) _ v:ab({ S}OO ) _ e + )...a(B - b) - (B - B) O 
t a t+ 1 t a t+1 - . 1 _ )... > , 
v:bb ({ S}OO ) _ v:ba({ S}OO ) _ (B - B) - )...a(B - b) t a t+ 1 t a t+1 - 1 _ )... > O, 
and 
V bb({aP}N.l}) - Vba ({aP}N.d) = (~=; > O and 
vaa({aP}nl}) - Vab({aP}nl}) _ *-
Vaa({aP}~d) - Vab({aP}~l}) + Vbb({aP}~d) - Vba({aP}~l}) - q -:l: 
q is asymptoticaHy stab1e by 1emma 1. Observe that a(qt+lk~o = {{aS}f;/, {aP}T'}. 
3. Parts 1.2 and 2.2 app1y to (a) and (b), respective1y. O 
Proof of Lemma 3. From 1emma 2 Ta({{aP}f;/, {aS}T'}) > Tb({{aP}f;/, {aS}T'}) 
when f3 - b 
qt < q + )...T-t-l(ij - q + a(l - )...)--) =q(T, t)
- - e 
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l· A(T t) d dq(T, t) O1m q , = q an d > 
T-+oo - t 
/:). = (1 _ )(1 _ A) [(eij(T, t)(l - qt)) P:1 _ (e(l - ij(T, t))qt) P:1] 
qt qt qt (1 - A)(3 (1 - A)(3 
1 
By the concavity of xR 
(1 - qt)(1 - A) (1 - q) (1 - A) f 
A ::; _ B-b or aH t ::; t' (1 - q(T, t)) (1 - 9: - A(q - 9: + a(l - A)-e)) 
and 
when a ::; ~~f. Therefore, 
and qt < ij(T, t), for aH t < T. o 
18 
